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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Cary Coglianese* 
Empirical research has been used to study many areas of law, 
including administrative law.  In this article Professor Coglianese dis-
cusses the current and future role of empirical research in understand-
ing and improving administrative rulemaking.  Criticism of govern-
ment regulation and calls for regulatory reform have grown in the last 
few decades.  Empirical research is a valuable tool for designing re-
forms that will truly improve the effectiveness, efficiency, and legiti-
macy of regulatory governance.  Specifically, Professor Coglianese 
discusses three areas of administrative law that have benefited from 
empirical research—economic review of new regulations, judicial re-
view of agency rulemaking, and negotiated rulemaking. 
Agencies are now required to perform a cost-benefit analysis of 
all major regulations.  Those analyses themselves are empirical in na-
ture, and further empirical research has been conducted to examine 
what effect these analyses have on the rulemaking process.  Judicial 
review has also benefited from empirical research, and would benefit 
from still further such research.  Scholars debate whether judicial re-
view improves governance or ossifies agencies due to fear of potential 
judicial challenges.  Despite the widespread belief that agencies are re-
treating from rulemaking, the empirical evidence is actually more 
mixed, with few agency rules ever reversed due to judicial review.  Fi-
nally, negotiated rulemaking is meant to avoid litigation and speed up 
the rulemaking process, yet the empirical research to date shows that 
negotiated rules take as long to develop as nonnegotiated rules, and 
are challenged more often than nonnegotiated rules.  Overall, empiri-
cal research on how procedures affect administrative agencies is vital 
to improving administrative law in ways that will contribute to more 
effective and legitimate governance. 
 
 * Associate Professor of Public Policy and Chair, Regulatory Policy Program, John F. Kennedy 
School of Government, Harvard University. 
Research for this article was supported in part by the Ford Foundation’s Innovations in American 
Government Program and the Dean’s Research Fund at the Kennedy School of Government.  The au-
thor gratefully acknowledges assistance by Jennifer Nash and Matthew Salloway and helpful comments 
from Elena Kagan, David Lazer, and Todd Olmstead. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Even though politicians may sometimes proclaim that the era of big 
government is over, government regulation has established a firm foot-
hold in the United States over the past century.  Each year, federal regu-
lations impose hundreds of billions of dollars in costs on the economy 
and provide significant benefits to society in terms of improved safety, 
health, and environmental conditions.1  Despite the permanence of gov-
ernment regulation, in recent decades the public has grown increasingly 
distrustful of government, and regulatory policy has found itself subject 
to controversy and criticism from virtually all quarters.2  According to 
some, government regulatory agencies have grown unresponsive and 
“ossified,” failing to achieve the public goals that they were established 
to serve.3  To others, regulatory policy has become afflicted with “tunnel 
vision,” with government devoting large amounts of resources to ad-
dressing relatively minor problems.4  Still others claim that the regulatory 
process suffers from the “pathologies of adversarial legalism” which in-
hibit the ability of government to develop more coherent and effective 
regulatory strategies.5 
Criticism of government regulation has sometimes resulted in 
changes to the substance of regulatory policy, such as has occurred with 
the deregulation of the airline and telecommunications sectors.6  For at 
least the past twenty years, however, some of the most prominent and 
persistent calls for regulatory reform have tended to be procedural ones, 
including proposals to make agency decision-making procedures more 
transparent, politically responsive, and analytically rigorous.7  These re-
form proposals have sought not so much to restructure the substance of 
regulatory policy, but instead to restructure the institutional environment 
of regulatory policymaking.  They have sought, in short, to change ad-
ministrative law. 
Recent regulatory reform proposals reveal how much administra-
tive law is centrally concerned with promoting more legitimate and effec-
 
 1. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, MAKING SENSE OF REGULATION 3 (2001), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/costbenefitreport.pdf (reporting estimated costs of social 
regulation ranging from about $150 billion to $250 billion annually, and estimated aggregate benefits 
of $250 billion to more than $1 trillion annually). 
 2. For analyses of recent criticisms of government in the United States, see DEREK BOK, THE 
TROUBLE WITH GOVERNMENT 43–55 (2001); WHY PEOPLE DON’T TRUST GOVERNMENT (Joseph S. 
Nye et al. eds., 1997). 
 3. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on Deossifying the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE 
L.J. 1385, 1387–96 (1992). 
 4. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 11–19 (1993). 
 5. See Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism and American Government, 10 J. PUB. POL. 
ANAL. & MGMT. 369, 384 (1991). 
 6. See MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 238–46 
(1985). 
 7. See generally Sheila Jasanoff, Negotiation or Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Middle Road for U.S. Pol-
icy?, 2 ENVTL. F., July 1983, at 37. 
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tive governance.8  Administrative law is constructed and reconstructed 
on the basis of assumptions about how particular procedural arrange-
ments will affect the behavior and performance of government officials 
and organizations.  As a result, the insights and methods of other disci-
plines, such as political science, economics, and organizational behavior 
have contributed greatly to the development of administrative law schol-
arship.9  Indeed, interest in interdisciplinary work in administrative law 
appears to be growing.  For example, much political economy analysis 
has focused on how legislatures and executives try to use administrative 
procedures to exercise control over the policy decisions of unelected bu-
reaucrats.10  Other recent research has analyzed judges’ voting records in 
administrative law cases to test the extent to which judicial decision mak-
ing correlates with political ideology.11 
Empirical research can contribute to a clearer understanding of the 
role that administrative law can play in democratic governance.  It can 
also give us a better idea of how reforms to regulatory institutions and 
processes can improve the effectiveness, efficiency, and legitimacy of 
regulatory governance.  Just as substantive changes to regulatory policy 
should be judged by their impact on society, so too should changes to the 
regulatory process be assessed by their outcomes.12  Given the steady in-
terest in reforming the regulatory process, empirical analysis can profita-
bly extend itself further and in new directions.  Scholars and policymak-
ers have much more to learn from the careful and systematic empirical 
study of administrative law. 
In this article, I argue for increased use of empirical analysis to 
evaluate how well institutional procedures and designs achieve public 
goals.  Social science research strategies provide an important basis for 
evaluating the effects of various kinds of procedures on administrative 
rulemaking.  After introducing some basic concepts and issues in empiri-
cal research on administrative law, I proceed to illustrate the value of 
empirical analysis by focusing on three salient aspects of regulatory pro-
 
 8. See Cary Coglianese, Administrative Law, in 1 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 87–88 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001). 
 9. See PETER H. SCHUCK, FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 3 (1994) (noting that much 
of administrative law scholarship “is a product of disciplines other than law relying on methodologies 
other than case analysis [and] embraces the positive and the normative, the empirical and theoretical, 
the doctrinal and behavioral”). 
 10. For examples of the growing public choice literature on administrative procedure, see infra 
note 16. 
 11. See William S. Jordan III, Judges, Ideology, and Policy in the Administrative State: Lessons 
from a Decade of Hard Look Remands of EPA Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 45, 47–48 (2001); Richard L. 
Revesz, Congressional Influence on Judicial Behavior? An Empirical Examination of Challenges to 
Agency Action in the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100, 1100–05 (2001); Richard L. Revesz, Envi-
ronmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1717–21 (1997).  For an 
example of the still broader literature on judicial behavior, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. 
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). 
 12. See Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 409 (1990) 
(arguing that “evaluation of regulatory controls and legal doctrine must depend in large part on their 
effects in the world”). 
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cedure:  (i) economic analysis of new agency rules; (ii) judicial review of 
agency rules; and (iii) negotiated rulemaking.  In these and other areas, 
empirical analysis provides decision makers and scholars with the means 
for making more informed choices about how to design effective and le-
gitimate governing institutions. 
I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND EMPIRICAL INQUIRY 
Administrative law seeks to guide the use of government authority 
in ways that promote values such as democracy, fairness, effectiveness, 
and efficiency.  Legal scholars have long recognized the discretion held 
by agency officials who are not directly accountable to the public, view-
ing this discretion both as a reality of legislative delegation as well as a 
problem to be solved.13  The aim in much of the literature has been to 
identify procedures that encourage administrators to exercise their dis-
cretion in socially desirable ways.  For example, by making administra-
tive decision making transparent through requirements for public com-
ment and open meetings, administrative procedures give citizens and 
organized interests the ability to represent their views in the administra-
tive process.14  Open procedures are thought to foster pluralist politics 
that protect against regulatory capture, the danger that an industry will 
come to control an agency’s decision making to secure private benefits.15 
More recently, researchers have studied administrative procedures 
as efforts by legislators to try to hardwire agency policymaking.16  From 
the standpoint of the legislator, administrative discretion creates the po-
tential for bureaucratic drift.  This occurs when the agency makes choices 
other than those the enacting legislative coalition would have preferred.  
Legislators themselves are not able to monitor directly all of the activi-
ties of the regulatory agencies they create.17  Consequently, administra-
 
 13. For empirically oriented treatments of agency discretion, see MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-
LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES 13–28 (1980); THE USES 
OF DISCRETION 47–88 (Keith Hawkins ed., 1992). 
 14. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 
(1975). 
 15. For one of the classic discussions of regulatory capture, see George J. Stigler, The Theory of 
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGT. SCI. 3 (1971). 
 16. See Kathleen Bawn, Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices About Admin-
istrative Procedures, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62 (1995); David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Adminis-
trative Procedures, Information and Agency Discretion, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 697 (1994); John Ferejohn 
& Charles Shipan, Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1990); Jonathan 
R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 93 (1992); Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political 
Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987); Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics 
and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 
(1989); David B. Spence, Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law to Steer Administrative Agencies, 
28 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1999); Pablo T. Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller, Decision Costs and the Strategic 
Design of Administrative Process and Judicial Review, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 347 (1997). 
 17. See Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT 
GOVERN? 271, 271–72 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989). 
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tive procedures provide a potential solution to the problem of bureau-
cratic drift as they may facilitate monitoring by interest groups or other-
wise help entrench the policy preferences of the original legislative coali-
tion.18 
Positive political economy has made an important contribution by 
revealing how administrative procedures can be policy instruments them-
selves.  When legislators or executive branch officials impose procedural 
requirements on administrative agencies, they purportedly do so in order 
to achieve some instrumental goals, including improving the efficiency or 
cost-effectiveness of regulations, preventing capture, reducing conflict, or 
changing the pace of the rulemaking process.  These goals may not al-
ways be, or perhaps even are seldom likely to be, fully consistent with the 
broader public interest, but the reforms are nevertheless intended to 
have some consequences.  A key question is whether different proce-
dural arrangements actually achieve the goals that they are intended to 
achieve or that others might want them to serve. 
Reform proposals are based, either explicitly or implicitly, on a set 
of claims about how some outcome in the world would be different (usu-
ally for the better) if the reforms were adopted.  Through empirical 
analysis, the researcher is able to assess the impact of these reforms, or 
any other policy intervention, on those intended outcomes.  Such analysis 
provides a basis for understanding how changes in the behavior and out-
comes of regulatory agencies arise due to changes in the standards and 
procedures that govern these agencies.  In short, empirical analysis shows 
whether administrative law makes a difference. 
From the standpoint of those interested in institutional design and 
regulatory policy, empirical analysis is essential to determining how insti-
tutions and procedures affect regulatory decision making.  For example, 
in deciding whether to impose or keep in place requirements that agen-
cies conduct cost-benefit analysis before issuing new rules, the key ques-
tion is whether regulatory decisions improve with respect to intended 
and measurable criteria when these requirements are imposed.  Do the 
requirements lead to regulatory decisions that are themselves more effi-
cient?  This necessitates empirical analysis to determine the costs and 
benefits of regulatory decisions made in the absence of these require-
ments, and to compare them with the costs and benefits of regulations 
made under conditions where economic analysis requirements are im-
posed.  Also, it will be relevant to investigate whether such requirements 
lead to other changes in regulatory decisions.  For instance, do they delay 
the imposition of new regulations that might otherwise be net beneficial?  
To decide whether the benefits of additional economic analysis outweigh 
the costs of conducting the analysis, it is necessary to evaluate the impact 
 
 18. See, e.g., DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A 
TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 24–27 
(1999) (discussing administrative procedures as a solution to the problem of bureaucratic drift). 
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analytical requirements have in terms of relevant outcomes of interest, 
such as efficiency or rulemaking time. 
The purpose of empirical analysis, at its core, is to explain variation 
and support causal inferences.  Empirical analysts of administrative law 
seek to determine whether measured outcomes vary depending on which 
procedure is used.  The aim is to identify how much of what is observed 
can be attributed to a particular procedure as opposed to other factors 
that might affect the outcomes of concern.  This is accomplished by com-
paring the observed outcomes with estimates of the counterfactual, or 
what would have happened in the absence of the regulatory procedure 
being tested.19 
Researchers can never observe the counterfactual because it calls 
for them to consider what would have happened rather than what did 
happen.20  However, empirical analysts can frequently make reasonably 
valid estimates of what would have happened for purposes of compari-
son.  They do this by measuring a set of outcomes that arise under a new 
procedure with the outcomes that arise in a similar context where the 
new procedure does not exist. 
There are three basic ways to conduct empirical research.21  The 
first of these, a controlled experiment, is the ideal model for empirical 
research.  In a controlled experiment, researchers control conditions in a 
laboratory environment, varying one factor at a time so that any change 
in outcome can be attributed to the factor that was varied.  If all the 
other potential contributing factors to the outcome are held constant, the 
counterfactual can be estimated quite clearly.  It is evidenced by the out-
come prior to the change made in the factor manipulated by the re-
searcher.  With this approach, researchers can have an extremely high 
degree of confidence that any resulting changes were due to the treat-
ment manipulated by the researcher.  Of course, empirical analysis of 
administrative law cannot proceed via the kind of laboratory experi-
ments that are used in the physical sciences, but the controlled experi-
ment does provide an important model for other research strategies. 
The second way empirical research can be structured is to use a 
randomized experiment, which is the next best strategy to a controlled 
experiment.  A randomized experiment requires that the outcomes in a 
group of treated entities (the treatment group) be compared with the 
outcomes in a group of untreated entities (the control group).  The con-
trol group provides the basis upon which the researcher can infer the 
 
 19. LAWRENCE B. MOHR, IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR PROGRAM EVALUATION 2–3 (2d ed. 1995) 
(“The crux of the impact analysis of the efficacy of a treatment program . . . is a comparison of what 
did happen after implementing the program with what would have appeared had the program not 
been implemented.”) (emphasis omitted); see also Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 37 (2002) (discussing counter-factual inference). 
 20. See MOHR, supra note 19, at 2–3. 
 21. For a thorough discussion of research design strategies, see DONALD T. CAMPBELL & 
JULIAN C. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH (1963). 
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counterfactual.  Of course, it is always possible that factors other than the 
treatment could explain any observed differences in outcome between 
two groups.  This potential for confounding factors is addressed by ran-
domly assigning the treatment so that, on average, changes in any con-
founding factors will cancel each other out across both the control and 
treatment groups, leaving any observed difference in outcomes attrib-
uted with confidence to the treatment.  By definition, the randomized 
experiment requires random assignment of the treatment, and this may 
seldom be feasible in the realm of administrative law or other settings 
where norms of equal treatment prevail. 
The third way to design empirical research is through an observa-
tional study, which is available whenever laboratory controls and ran-
domized treatment are not feasible.  There are two basic types of obser-
vational studies:  longitudinal and cross-sectional.  A longitudinal design 
compares outcomes over time.  The outcomes before the adoption of a 
reform are compared with outcomes after its adoption.  A cross-sectional 
design compares outcomes in the same time period between one group 
operating under the procedure and one that does not.  In other words, 
the researcher can compare the outcomes in jurisdictions or individual 
cases that operate under one set of procedures with jurisdictions or cases 
operating under another procedure.  If all things other than the existence 
of the procedure are equal, then the researcher can make a strong infer-
ence that observable differences in the outcomes between the two groups 
over time or across domains resulted from the procedure.  This is re-
ferred to as the procedure’s impact. 
Of course, other things are not always equal in an observational 
study because the treatment and comparison groups have not been ran-
domly selected.  As a result, the researcher needs to take into account 
factors other than the procedure that might be affecting the outcome.22  
Sometimes, for example, procedural changes occur in conjunction with 
other changes, making it more difficult to untangle the precise effect of 
the procedure versus other factors.  For example, consider how a re-
searcher might assess the impact of President Reagan’s 1981 executive 
order requiring agencies to conduct economic analysis for all major rules.  
If a researcher simply compared regulations prior to 1981 with those is-
sued later, it might be difficult to determine how much of any observed 
difference is due to the executive order versus how much is due to the 
fact that Reagan political appointees, possessing different policy ideolo-
gies than their predecessors, took charge of the various federal regula-
tory agencies at about the same time.  A way around this potential prob-
lem might be to shift from a longitudinal design to a cross-sectional one, 
comparing regulatory decisions at the state level.  Researchers might 
compare similar kinds of regulatory decisions between states with eco-
 
 22. See Epstein & King, supra note 19, at 78. 
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nomic analysis requirements and states without such requirements, all 
the while controlling for other factors that might affect the outcome such 
as party control of the state’s legislature or governor’s office. 
A related problem may arise when agencies can voluntarily choose 
to adopt a procedure.  For example, imagine that agencies were not re-
quired to conduct economic analysis but could voluntarily choose to do 
so.  Researchers comparing outcomes in those rulemakings where the 
agency chose to conduct an analysis with those where it did not would 
confront a significant possibility of selection bias.23  The rules voluntarily 
selected for economic analysis may well not be a representative subset of 
all agency rules.  One might speculate that agencies would be more likely 
to employ benefit-cost analysis voluntarily for those rules that the agency 
believes have positive net benefits.  Alternatively, agencies might volun-
tarily use economic analysis for those rules which have the largest costs 
associated with them, which could mean that from the start these would 
be rules that are less likely to have positive net benefits.  An empirical 
researcher would therefore need to consider whether selection bias 
might partly explain any differences found between the treatment and 
comparison groups.24 
If the samples being compared are large and randomly selected, and 
assignments to the treatment group are also made randomly, then re-
searchers can have considerable confidence in inferences about the pro-
cedure’s impact, as other factors should be distributed about the same in 
both samples.25  Large random samples, however desirable, are not nec-
essary in order to draw reasonable inferences, and random assignment is 
often not available in empirical research on administrative law.26  In the 
absence of random assignment and large samples, empirical researchers 
who undertake longitudinal or cross-sectional observational studies still 
must seek to control for other possible factors and assess the degree of 
confidence they can properly have in their inferences.  Analysis can and 
does proceed even in the absence of large samples, but researchers must 
select an appropriate research design and take care to consider possible 
threats to the validity of their inferences.27  Only through such careful 
and systematic empirical research will scholars be able to learn how ef-
 
 23. See GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN 
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 128–38 (1994) (discussing the general problem of selection bias in empirical 
research). 
 24. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated 
Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1312–21 (1997) (investigating the potential for selection bias in a 
cross-sectional study of the impact of negotiated rulemaking). 
 25.  KING ET AL., supra note 23, at 94 (discussing the value of random selection and large sam-
ples). 
 26. Id. at 94–95 (noting that inferences can be made even without large, random samples). 
 27. See MOHR, supra note 19, at 55–92 (discussing potential threats to “the validity of an infer-
ence or conclusion about a program impact based on a certain design”); Epstein & King, supra note 
19, at 112–14 (discussing strategies for research based on small samples). 
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fective different procedural reforms turn out to be in improving govern-
ment regulation. 
II. ECONOMIC REVIEW OF NEW REGULATIONS 
Perhaps the most significant and persistent complaint about gov-
ernment regulation has been that it imposes excessive costs on the econ-
omy.  For decades, reformers have argued for more cost-effective and ef-
ficient forms of regulation than currently exist.28  It is widely accepted 
that the costs of different health, safety, and environmental regulations 
vary markedly, with some regulations costing only tens of thousands of 
dollars for each life saved while others cost billions of dollars per life 
saved.29  This variation in cost-effectiveness suggests that government 
could save more lives for an equivalent investment of social resources by 
reallocating its priorities toward those regulatory efforts that are most 
cost-effective.30 
Reforms to improve the cost-effectiveness of federal regulation date 
back at least to the Ford administration.31  In 1981, President Reagan is-
sued an executive order requiring agencies to conduct economic analysis 
of proposed regulations and to have their analyses reviewed by the Of-
fice of Management and Budget, an approach that has been followed by 
each subsequent administration.32  In the mid-1990s, Congress proposed 
legislation that would have required agencies not only to conduct eco-
nomic analysis, but to have new regulations effectively pass a benefit-cost 
test.33  While some of the more sweeping proposals introduced at the 
 
 28. For some of the early economic analysis of less costly regulatory strategies, see JOHN DALES, 
POLLUTION, PROPERTY, PRICES (1968); A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932). 
 29. See BREYER, supra note 4, at 24–27; Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Reform: What Do the 
Government’s Numbers Tell Us?, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS 
FROM REGULATION 208, 230–31 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996); John F. Morrall III, A Review of the 
Record, 10 REGULATION 25 (1986); Tammy O. Tengs et al., Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions 
and Their Cost-Effectiveness, 15 RISK ANALYSIS 369, 371 (1995); W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regu-
lators, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1423 (1996); SHEILA M. CAVANAGH ET AL., NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY DURING THE CLINTON YEARS (John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University 
Faculty Research Working Paper No. RWP01-027, June 2001). 
 30. See Tammy O. Tengs & John D. Graham, The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social In-
vestments in Life-Saving, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM 
REGULATION, supra note 29, at 167, 177 (suggesting that as many as 60,000 additional lives could have 
been saved each year if society reallocated its investments more cost-effectively across nearly 200 life-
saving strategies). 
 31. For a review of the history of rulemaking reform, see Murray Weidenbaum, Regulatory 
Process Reform: From Ford to Clinton, 20 REGULATION 20 (1997).  Similar kinds of reforms have oc-
curred at the state level.  See ROBERT W. HAHN, State and Federal Regulatory Reform: A Comparative 
Analysis, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 37 
(Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001). 
 32. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981) (issued by President 
Reagan and affirmed by President George H.W. Bush); Exec. Order No. 12,886, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 
(Oct. 4, 1993) (issued by President Clinton and so far retained by President George W. Bush). 
 33. See, e.g., Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S. 291, 104th Cong. (1995) (proposing to require 
agencies, prior to issuing a new rule, to make “a reasonable determination . . . that the benefits of the 
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time were never adopted, Congress did pass the Unfunded Mandates Re-
form Act,34 which essentially codified existing executive branch require-
ments for agencies to perform economic analysis.35  Agencies are now re-
quired by both executive order and statutory prescription to perform an 
assessment of the costs and benefits of any proposed regulation that 
would impose annual costs of more than $100 million on the economy.36 
These changes to the administrative process aim to increase the 
cost-effectiveness and efficiency of federal regulation by compelling 
agencies to assess benefits and costs and to search for the lowest cost 
strategies.  Executive Order 12,866 adopts the principle that agencies 
should “assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives, 
including the alternative of not regulating,” and “in choosing among al-
ternative regulatory approaches, agencies should select those approaches 
that maximize net benefits.”37  By conducting the required economic 
analyses, agencies are confronted with the need to define problems, ar-
ticulate alternative solutions, and consider which solution will best solve 
the problem using the least amount of resources. 
The way that economic analysis is supposed to lead to improved ef-
ficiency can be specified in three basic steps.  First, by conducting eco-
nomic analysis, an agency is supposed to arrive at reasonably accurate 
estimates of the benefits and costs of different policy options.  Second, 
the agency is supposed to make decisions that are consistent with the re-
sults of this economic analysis, that is, by choosing the options that im-
pose the lowest costs for a given level of benefits or that achieve the 
greatest net benefits.  Finally, the decisions that agencies make on the 
basis of economic analysis should be different from—that is, more effi-
cient than—the ones that they would make in the absence of the analysis.  
If an agency would still have adopted the least cost or greatest net bene-
fit approach in the absence of the economic analysis requirement, then 
the requirement would be superfluous.  In short, economic analysis re-
quirements need to have an independent effect on what an agency does, 
making its decisions more efficient than they otherwise would be. 
How well has the process of requiring economic analysis improved 
the efficiency of regulatory outcomes?  Even though intuitively it may 
seem that such a requirement would make a difference, the question is 
ultimately an empirical one.  Rather than simply assuming that an eco-
nomic analysis requirement will lead to more cost-effective or efficient 
decisions, empirical analysis can be used to determine whether and how 
 
rule justify the costs of the rule, and that the rule will substantially achieve the rulemaking objectives 
in a more cost-effective manner”). 
 34. 2 U.S.C. § 1501 (1997). 
 35. For a discussion of the proposed regulatory reform legislation in the 1990s, see CAVANAGH 
ET AL., supra note 29, at 10–13, 44–47. 
 36. 2 U.S.C. § 1532(a)(2); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). 
 37. Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 32, § 1. 
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the procedural requirement for economic analysis changes regulatory 
outcomes. 
A growing body of empirical research has recently emerged that ex-
amines the impact of economic analysis requirements.  With respect to 
the accuracy of economic analysis, several studies have raised questions 
about the quality of economic analyses that agencies have performed in 
response to the requirements of the executive orders.  For one thing, 
many agencies apparently do not manage to collect the kind of informa-
tion that is required of them and that would be necessary to determine 
the net benefits of different regulatory alternatives. 
Robert Hahn and a team of researchers have examined the eco-
nomic analyses agencies produced in nearly fifty major health, safety, 
and environmental rulemaking proceedings, and have assessed the extent 
to which the analyses met the requirements stated in Executive Order 
12,866, as well as in guidelines issued by the OMB.38  Although agencies 
are directed to compare different regulatory options, and wherever pos-
sible to choose the one that maximizes net benefits, Hahn and his team 
found that in only about a quarter of the rules they examined did agen-
cies even quantify the costs and benefits of different regulatory options.39  
Furthermore, for a substantial percentage of the rules they examined, the 
agencies did not monetize all the costs and benefits they quantified.40  
Hahn’s team also found that agencies sometimes used inconsistent dis-
count rates in converting future costs and benefits into present value 
terms.41  They concluded that “most economic analyses do not meet the 
expectations set forth in the Executive Order and the OMB guidelines, 
and a significant percentage clearly violate them.”42 
When agencies do monetize costs and benefits before issuing a new 
regulation, the accuracy of these estimates is open to empirical scrutiny 
after the regulation has been implemented.  Recent studies have at-
tempted to assess how well the cost and benefit predictions made by 
regulatory agencies accurately reflect the costs and benefits that are in-
curred after a regulation is adopted.  For example, James Hammitt com-
pared the pre-adoption predictions of regulatory costs associated with 
reducing CFC consumption in the United States with post-adoption 
data.43  He found that some of the pre-adoption predictions substantially 
overestimated the control costs associated with the CFC-phasedown, in 
 
 38. Robert W. Hahn et al., Assessing Regulatory Impact Analyses: The Failure of Agencies to 
Comply with Executive Order 12,866, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 859 (2000).  For the OMB guide-
lines, see OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, GUIDELINES TO STANDARDIZE MEASURES OF COSTS AND 
BENEFITS AND THE FORMAT OF ACCOUNTING STATEMENTS (2000). 
 39. Hahn et al., supra note 38, at 874. 
 40. Id. at 866–70 (reporting that only about sixty percent of the analyses monetized all the costs 
identified by agencies, while only about thirty percent monetized all the identified benefits). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 865. 
 43. James K. Hammitt, Are the Costs of Proposed Environmental Regulations Overestimated? 
Evidence from the CFC Phaseout, 16 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 281 (2000). 
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part due to the unanticipated development of lower cost substitutes for 
CFCs.44  In another study, researchers at Resources for the Future com-
pared the ex ante cost predictions made by agencies in twenty-five rule-
makings with ex post findings made by independent experts.45  In nearly 
half the cases, costs were overestimated ex ante, while in a quarter they 
were underestimated.46  The ex ante estimates were deemed “accu-
rate”—by being, ex post, within the estimated range or within a range of 
no more than twenty-five percent above or below any point estimates—
in only a quarter of the cases.47 
On the basis of findings such as these, some researchers have sug-
gested that economic analyses may tend to exhibit “some upward bias of 
ex ante cost estimates relative to actual [costs] because neither firms nor 
regulators can predict accurately the cost-saving innovations that will 
likely occur once a real effort is made to comply with the rules.”48  Of 
course, it is also possible that agencies underestimate the costs, as well as 
over or underestimate the benefits, of new regulations.49 
Even assuming that economic analyses conducted by agencies were 
always thorough and accurate, it would remain to be determined whether 
they had an impact on the types of decisions made by regulatory agen-
cies.  Based on the government’s own numbers, it would seem that agen-
cies have not followed the results of their analyses.  After all, most of the 
research purporting to show the inefficiency of existing regulation has 
been based on the very economic analyses that agencies have been re-
quired to produce.50  Among those rules for which agencies monetized 
regulatory impacts (which is only a fraction of all rules), about a quarter 
of them fail a benefit-cost test.51  More than forty percent of all environ-
mental regulations with monetized impacts reportedly fail to yield posi-
tive net benefits.52  Perhaps the most pessimistic interpretation of these 
findings might be that economic analysis has had its greatest impact in 
documenting the inefficiency of government regulation, not in reducing 
it.53 
 
 44. Id. at 296–97. 
 45. Winston Harrington et al., On the Accuracy of Regulatory Cost Estimates (Jan. 1999) (Re-
sources for the Future Discussion Paper No. 99-18) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Re-
view). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Richard D. Morgenstern & Marc K. Landy, Economic Analysis: Benefits, Costs, Implications, 
in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA: ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT 455, 468 (Richard D. Morgen-
stern ed., 1997). 
 49. Hahn, supra note 29, at 228. 
 50. See sources cited supra notes 38, 43, and 45. 
 51. ROBERT W. HAHN, REVIVING REGULATORY REFORM 57 (2001), available at http://www.aei. 
brookings.org/publications/books/rrr.pdf. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Cf. Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal 
Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489 (2002) (suggesting that 
government’s commitment to benefit-cost analysis has often been “symbolic rather than real”). 
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The mere fact that inefficient regulations continue to be issued, 
however, does not necessarily mean that economic analysis requirements 
have had no impact on regulatory decision making.  The appropriate 
empirical test is whether decisions made under a requirement for eco-
nomic analysis turn out to be less inefficient overall than decisions made 
without such a requirement.  Some researchers have suggested that, at 
the very least, the regime for economic review has resulted in eliminating 
or preventing regulations that were extremely inefficient outliers.54  
However, recent statistical analyses have failed to show that economic 
analysis and OMB review have significant effects on the cost-
effectiveness of government regulations.55 
A series of a dozen case studies of EPA rulemakings collected in a 
volume by Richard Morgenstern does indicate that economic studies can 
help improve regulatory decisions by providing regulators with informa-
tion needed to adopt more cost-effective policies.56  Yet Morgenstern 
also acknowledges that it is not clear whether these improvements came 
about “solely because of the economic analysis . . . [nor whether] the 
same or similar changes might not have occurred for other reasons.”57  
Researchers have yet to identify a clear counterfactual to use in assessing 
the extent to which these requirements affect regulatory outcomes.  Be-
cause relatively few economic analyses were produced (and still fewer 
were required) prior to 1981 when Reagan’s executive order was issued, 
it is difficult to compare regulatory outcomes before and after the impo-
sition of economic analysis requirements.  Yet the impact of analytical 
requirements can only be assessed with confidence by comparing regula-
tory decisions made under a regime of analytical requirements with deci-
sions about similar issues made in the absence of such requirements.  
One possible avenue for future empirical research would therefore be to 
compare regulations on similar issues across states with different re-
quirements for analysis.58 
 
 54. See Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981 (1998) 
(arguing that agencies never adopted some of their least cost-effective proposals); Viscusi, supra note 
29, at 1436 (noting that “OMB has succeeded in eliminating only extremely ineffective regulations”). 
 55. See HAHN, supra note 51, at 52 (finding that “OIRA review does not significantly affect cost-
effectiveness estimates”); Scott Farrow, Improving Regulatory Performance: Does Executive Office 
Oversight Matter? (July 26, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.aei.brookings.org/ 
publications/related/oversight.pdf) (indicating that overall “Executive Office review does not seem to 
improve (reduce) the cost-per-life-saved of regulation”); see also Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 53, at 
1540 (noting that although economic analysis has often helped lead to improvements, “the system for 
OIRA review has not succeeded in fundamentally redirecting regulation toward areas where it would 
do the most good”); Eric Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political 
Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137 (2001) (developing a model of economic review that 
yields the prediction that greater inefficiencies will result). 
 56. ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA: ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT (Richard D. Morgenstern 
ed., 1997). 
 57. Morgenstern & Landy, supra note 48, at 457. 
 58. An initial step in this direction can be found in Robert Hahn’s study of different states’ regu-
latory review requirements.  See HAHN, supra note 31.  Although we know that different states have 
different regulatory review requirements, we know much less about what kind of impact these differ-
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Another avenue for future research might be to study more system-
atically why economic analysis requirements have apparently not had 
more of an impact on agency decision making.  A variety of possible ex-
planations have been offered, some of which may apply more to different 
agencies or with respect to different rulemakings.  Agency officials, like 
others, may simply be boundedly rational, with a tendency to “satisfice” 
by not quantifying impacts or otherwise producing thorough analysis 
even when required to do so.59  Alternatively, agency officials may be 
ideologically resistant to the quantification or monetization of different 
kinds of social benefits and costs.60  Even if they are willing to quantify 
costs and benefits, agency officials may sometimes seek to promote other 
values that are not easily captured by economic analysis.61  They may re-
spond, due to interest group pressures or other factors, to the distribu-
tional effects of policies (that is, to how the costs and benefits are distrib-
uted) more than to the aggregate net social benefits which have typically 
been the focus of economic analyses.  Finally, they may simply be con-
strained by statutes that preclude the agency from considering benefit-
cost analysis in setting regulatory standards.62 
The effectiveness of any new or modified economic analysis re-
quirements will vary depending on which of these explanations accounts 
for inefficient regulation.  If agency officials are constrained by statutes 
or are ideologically resistant to benefit-cost analysis, then requiring its 
use may not do much to make agency decisions more efficient.  On the 
other hand, if agencies tend not to perform sound analyses because they 
tend simply to satisfice, regulatory requirements might prove to be more 
effective if they are accompanied by adequate incentives for agencies to 
undertake and rely upon serious, careful review.  Recent proposals have 
emphasized strengthening OMB review of agency analysis and even pro-
viding opportunities for judicial review of an agency’s economic analy-
sis.63  Of course, these proposals, if enacted, will merit their own empiri-
cal evaluation as well.   
The broader point is that, in order to develop institutional strategies 
to reduce the inefficiencies in government regulation, it will be beneficial 
 
ent requirements have in terms of achieving efficiency gains.  One recent study has examined the im-
pact of state regulatory review requirements in terms of the timeliness and frequency of regulatory 
change, finding that they do not appear to slow down the regulatory process significantly.  Stuart Orin 
Shapiro, Speed Bumps and Roadblocks: Procedural Controls and Regulatory Change (1998) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with author). 
 59. See JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 140–41 (1958); see also Her-
bert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059 (2000). 
 60. See generally STEVEN KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES?: ECONOMISTS AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT (1981). 
 61. See generally ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993). 
 62. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (holding that the Clean Air 
Act precludes the agency from taking costs into account when setting national ambient air quality 
standards). 
 63. See Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 53. 
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to understand better why they arise.  The available empirical research 
indicates that simply mandating analysis does not eliminate inefficiency, 
and it may not even significantly reduce it.  This is not to suggest that 
economic analysis requirements have had no important effects or should 
be abandoned.  It is instead to say that these effects have been neither as 
straightforward nor substantial as those who imposed these requirements 
probably hoped they would be.  To achieve greater regulatory coherence 
and efficiency, decision makers will require further empirical research, as 
they will need to know whether and how to strengthen existing require-
ments, improve the quality of regulatory analyses, and realign incentives 
so that agencies will act to achieve greater net benefits for society. 
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKING 
Although compliance with economic analysis requirements is not 
currently enforceable through judicial review,64 the courts do have the 
authority to enforce nearly all other legal requirements imposed on 
agencies.  Much administrative law scholarship is based on the premise 
that judicial review of administrative action, if employed properly, can 
improve governance.65  An analysis of what should be the proper role 
and standards for judicial review therefore depends on empirical claims 
about the effects courts have on the behavior of administrative agen-
cies.66  These effects may include making agencies more observant of leg-
islative mandates, increasing the analytic quality of agency decision mak-
ing, and promoting agency responsiveness to a wide range of interests.67  
Administrators who know that their actions may be subjected to judicial 
review may exercise greater overall care, making better, fairer, and more 
responsive decisions than administrators who are insulated from judicial 
oversight. 
Notwithstanding these potential benefits, legal scholars have in-
creasingly emphasized courts’ potentially debilitating effects on agency 
rulemaking.  In the early 1970s, rulemaking was considered to be, in 
Kenneth Culp Davis’s terms, “one of the greatest inventions of modern 
government.”68  Yet it is now widely accepted that the rulemaking proc-
ess has become “ossified,” as agencies are thought to take years to issue 
 
 64. 2 U.S.C. § 1571 (2000); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,744 (Oct. 4, 1993). 
 65. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL 
CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: 
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE (1990). 
 66. Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliot, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal 
Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 987 (describing the belief that courts control the behavior of 
agencies as “one of the raisons d’etre of most of administrative law”). 
 67. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency Ac-
tion, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 537 (suggesting that “judicial review has, in many settings, increased the in-
cidence of legality, prevented arbitrariness, ensured against undesirable regulation, and brought about 
regulatory controls that have saved lives or otherwise accomplished considerable good”). 
 68. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.15, at 283 (1970 & Supp. 
1971). 
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new regulations and in some cases have allegedly retreated altogether 
from issuing new rules.69  Legal scholars agree that one of the principal 
reasons administrative rulemaking has become ossified is the threat of 
judicial review.  Government agencies are thought to face a high prob-
ability that their actions will be subject to litigation.70  This threat of judi-
cial review, combined with the uncertainty over what a reviewing court 
will find to be “arbitrary and capricious,” has been viewed as creating 
significant delays for agencies seeking to develop regulations.71  The 
looming possibility of judicial review, Thomas McGarity has argued, 
means that “agencies are constantly ‘looking over their shoulders’ at the 
reviewing courts in preparing supporting documents, in writing pream-
bles, in responding to public comments, and in assembling the rulemak-
ing ‘record.’”72 
In some cases, agencies have allegedly retreated altogether from ef-
forts to establish new regulations.  The U.S. National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA) is often viewed as the poster child of 
ossification.  A prominent study by Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst is 
premised on the claim that NHTSA has shifted away from developing 
new auto safety standards in order to avoid judicial reversal.73  Mashaw 
and Harfst claim that “devastating” losses in rulemaking litigation in the 
early 1970s led NHTSA to retreat from rulemaking.74  They claim that 
most of NHTSA’s safety standards were put into place before 1974 and 
none have been issued since 1976.75  They also argue that, instead of issu-
ing new rules, NHTSA shifted its efforts toward increasing the number of 
recalls of defective vehicles, an approach which they argue leaves 
NHTSA less susceptible to judicial reversal.76  Administrative law schol-
ars appear almost universally to accept that pre-enforcement judicial re-
 
 69. Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE 
L.J. 1385 (1992).  The first use of the metaphor of “ossification” in this context is usually attributed to 
Donald Elliott.  Id. at 1385–86. 
 70. See, e.g., CARNEGIE COMM’N ON SCI., TECH. & GOV’T, RISK AND THE ENVIRONMENT: 
IMPROVING REGULATORY DECISION MAKING 109 (1993) (“In some agencies, 80 percent of major 
rules are appealed.”). 
 71. See R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
(1983); JOHN M. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF TOXIC SUBSTANCE REGULATION (1988); Jerry L. 
Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE 
J. ON REG. 257 (1987); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of Judicial Review of Agency 
Rules: How Federal Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of the 1990s, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 7 
(1991). 
 72. McGarity, supra note 69, at 1412. 
 73. JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990). 
 74. Id. at 87–88. 
 75. Id. at 12. 
 76. Id.; see also Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Inside the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration: Legal Determinants of Bureaucratic Organization and Performance, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 
443, 443 (1990) (noting that “the judiciary reacted . . . favorably to NHTSA’s recall efforts”). 
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view of regulations at NHTSA, as well as at other agencies, has led to a 
decline in new regulations.77 
The view that judicial review has ossified the rulemaking process 
has important implications for regulatory reform debates.  Judicial re-
view has not only been advocated as a means of promoting compliance 
with economic analysis requirements, it has also been opposed because 
of concerns about the paralysis of the regulatory process.78  What is 
needed is empirical evidence to inform decision making about whether to 
expand or contract opportunities for judicial review.  Yet administrative 
law scholars have failed generally to produce systematic empirical analy-
sis of the effects of judicial review.79  Empirical analysis can help to de-
termine the extent to which administrative rulemaking has declined as 
well as how heightened judicial review may have affected the level of 
rulemaking output by agencies. 
The empirical evidence for a retreat from rulemaking in the face of 
stringent judicial review is not nearly as clear as has been generally sup-
posed.  As Figure 1 shows, the number of pages in the Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) has grown consistently over the years, even in the 
face of the courts’ hard look review in the 1970s.  Moreover, the volume 
of regulations issued by specific agencies has experienced a similar 
growth.  From 1976–1996, the overall volume of regulations in the CFR 
slightly less than doubled.80  NHTSA, the agency that has been widely 
perceived to have abandoned rulemaking, slightly more than doubled its 
 
 77. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE (1997) (arguing that “[t]he 
past decade’s case study literature on the performance of America’s administrative agencies details an 
agency-by-agency retreat from rulemaking.”); Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA 
and the Courts: Twenty Years of Law and Politics, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 249 n.2 (1991) 
(indicating that the effects of ossification should apply to the EPA because it “is the largest and most 
active of the environment, health, and safety regulatory agencies [and] over 80% of EPA’s regulations 
are challenged in court”); McGarity, supra note 69, at 1412 (“[S]tringent judicial review is largely re-
sponsible for [NHTSA’s] virtual abandonment of rulemaking in favor of case-by-case recalls.”); Rich-
ard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia 
Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 311 (“NHTSA has aban-
doned almost completely its efforts to establish policy through rulemaking.”). 
 78. Frank B. Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies of Judicial Review of Administrative Rulemaking, 78 
N.C. L. REV. 1013, 1014, 1020–27 (2000) (arguing against judicial review because it creates undesirable 
consequences, including ossifying “the rulemaking process, making administrators slow and timid to 
address their responsibilities.”); see also McGarity, supra note 67, at 1454 (urging courts to reduce the 
stringency of their review of rulemaking); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rule-
making, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59 (1995) (advocating changes to judicial doctrine and remedies to reduce 
the ossification of rulemaking).  But see Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Re-
cent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483 
(1997) (suggesting that changes to the standards for judicial review are premature and will not signifi-
cantly reduce regulatory ossification). 
 79. See Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 71, at 275 (noting that “the normative expectations of ad-
ministrative lawyers have seldom been subjected to empirical verification of a more than anecdotal 
sort”); Schuck & Elliott, supra note 66, at 985 (observing that “we still know little about what is per-
haps the central question in [the] field [of administrative law]:  How does judicial review actually affect 
agency decisionmaking?”). 
 80. In 1976, the CFR spanned 72,740 pages. By 1996, it had grown to 132,112 pages (or 1.8 times 
more pages). 
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CFR pages during the same period (a period subsequent to the early ju-
dicial defeats that purportedly sent NHTSA into rulemaking retreat).81  
It seems clear that regulatory agencies have not abandoned their use of 
rulemaking. 
FIGURE 1 
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The impact of rulemaking has also grown, as indicated by the costs 
that regulations impose on the economy.  For example, the annual costs 
associated with environmental regulations have risen in constant dollars 
from $33 billion in 1972 to $141 billion in 1992.82  Even though NHTSA 
has been thought to have retreated from rulemaking since the mid-1970s, 
the agency continues to impose significant regulatory costs on the auto-
mobile industry.  Prior to NHTSA’s judicial defeats in 1972, complying 
with the agency’s safety standards added no more than about $200 to the 
cost of the average car, but by 1984 the agency’s safety regulations had 
imposed costs of nearly $900 per car.83  These costs appear only to have 
risen further since the 1980s.84 
Available data on the volume and costs of regulation do not appear 
to support the prevailing view that agencies have retreated from rule-
 
 81. NHTSA’s auto safety regulations took up 218 pages in the CFR in 1976 and 484 pages in 
1996 (or 2.2 times more pages). 
 82. Adam B. Jaffe et al., Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of U.S. Manufactur-
ing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J. ECON. LITERATURE 132, 140 (1995). 
 83. ROBERT W. CRANDALL ET AL., REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE 37 tbl.3-4 (1986).  Even 
assuming a five percent rate of decline in costs due to a learning curve, Crandall et al. estimate that 
compliance costs would have increased nearly three times from 1972 to 1984.  Id. 
 84. See CHARLES H. FINE ET AL., THE U.S. AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 77 
(1996), available at http://www.ta.doc.gov/Reports/autos/auto.pdf (noting that “safety regulations have 
added about $1,000 to the average selling price of passenger cars since 1980”). 
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making.  However, these data may not seem quite as surprising in light of 
recent empirical research on the frequency of judicial reversals of agency 
rulemaking.  While many observers have previously thought that judicial 
review is virtually assured for most agencies following issuance of a new 
rule, the probability of judicial scrutiny is something that can be empiri-
cally determined.85  It turns out, when the data are collected, that only a 
fraction of agency rules are ever subject to petitions for review.86  More-
over, only a fraction of the challenges reach a judicial panel for decision; 
only a fraction of judicial decisions result in rules being remanded to the 
agency; and only a fraction of remands actually result in blocking the 
agency’s decision. 
For example, even though it is widely believed that most EPA rules, 
or at least most significant EPA rules, are challenged in court,87 data re-
veal that the actual rate is only about 26%, and that even the most sig-
nificant rules are subject to petitions for review only about 35% the 
time.88  After petitions for review are filed challenging EPA rules, only 
about 29% of them ever result in a decision of an appellate panel.89  Vol-
untary settlement, it turns out, is a common means of disposing of judi-
cial review litigation.90  Moreover, in those cases that do result in judges’ 
decisions on the merits, in at least half of the cases the agency decision is 
upheld entirely.91  Of those rules that are remanded to the agency by a 
court, in only about 14% of the cases does the remand appear to present 
a serious obstacle to the agency in achieving its original objectives.92 
Some of these data come from different samples, so care is needed 
in extrapolating across the different studies.  Nevertheless, it is illustra-
tive to note that when these data are combined it appears that judicial 
review blocks the EPA from taking action in only about 0.5% of all its 
rulemakings.  Rather than indicating that judicial review has devastating 
 
 85. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 66, at 988–89. 
 86. Since 1981, about 300 reported judicial decisions based on the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard have appeared reviewing the actions of five federal regulatory agencies combined (NHTSA, 
EPA, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Food and Drug Administration, and the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission).  Yet over this same period, these five agencies have together 
promulgated more than 15,000 new regulations.  The number of judicial decisions (not all of which 
involved reversals) therefore represents only about two percent of the overall output of these regula-
tory agencies. 
 87. For an extensive list of sources claiming that litigants challenge eighty percent of the rules 
that EPA issues, see Coglianese, supra note 24, at app. D. 
 88. Id. at 1298–1300 (reporting data on the incidence of litigation filed against EPA’s significant 
rules under the Clean Air Act and RCRA). 
 89. Id. at 1308 n.247. 
 90. See Cary Coglianese, Litigating Within Relationships: Disputes and Disturbance in the Regu-
latory Process, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 735, 756 (1996). 
 91. See Coglianese, supra note 24, at 1308–09 n.249; Patricia M. Wald, Regulation at Risk: Are 
Courts Part of the Solution or Most of the Problem?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 636–39 (1994). 
 92. William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Signifi-
cantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 
NW. U. L. REV. 393, 440 (2000) (“[A]gencies have successfully implemented their policies in approxi-
mately 80% of the instances in which courts have originally remanded rules as arbitrary and capri-
cious.”). 
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impacts on agencies, these data appear instead to support Martin 
Shapiro’s observation that “the courts generally let the agencies do what 
they want.”93  Of course, this does not mean that there are never any im-
portant legal decisions reversing agency rulemakings, just that as a per-
centage of rulemakings such obstructive judicial decisions are quite a 
rare occurrence.94 
The fact that judicial review occurs much less frequently than 
thought also does not necessarily mean that judicial review has had no 
effects on agency behavior.  Perhaps in some subset of the most signifi-
cant rulemakings judicial review does make agencies more careful, hesi-
tant, or both.  Indeed, it is possible that agencies have prevailed so often 
because they refrain from taking action that would expose them to litiga-
tion risks.95  This, of course, would generally be consistent with the ossifi-
cation hypothesis, which supposes that agencies have to work harder to 
produce rules that will withstand judicial scrutiny.  Yet if a rulemaking 
retreat is truly occurring, which several case study authors have claimed, 
this retreat is not reflected in the growth in CFR pages and the increasing 
costs associated with environmental and safety regulations.  The growth 
in regulations and regulatory costs would appear to be more consistent 
with the evidence that shows that the probability of judicial reversal is 
quite low. 
Admittedly, there are challenges in assessing the impact of judicial 
review or any other purportedly “ossifying” requirement on federal 
agencies.  Since such requirements tend to apply across all federal agen-
cies, it is often difficult to find appropriate cross-sectional comparisons 
between different agencies.  Analysis of agency rulemaking over time 
may be complicated if changes in judicial doctrines or other regulatory 
oversight procedures have occurred at about the same time as changes in 
other plausible factors affecting rulemaking, such as the party affiliation 
of the executive branch. 
In a recent study, Stuart Shapiro sought to overcome these chal-
lenges by examining the ossification of rulemaking at the state level.  To 
ensure variation across states, he chose to study day care regulation, an 
area that has remained largely unencumbered by preemptive federal 
regulatory standards.96  Relying on a series of carefully selected matched 
case studies, Shapiro found that day care regulators in states with seem-
ingly cumbersome rulemaking procedures were generally not deterred 
 
 93. MARTIN SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 270–71 (1968); 
see also Christine B. Harrington, Regulatory Reform: Creating Gaps and Making Markets, 10 LAW & 
POL’Y 293, 305 (1988) (observing that “[t]he pace of regulatory litigation has not increased sharply in 
the last fifteen years nor has judicial support for agency rules weakened”). 
 94. These data appear generally consistent with the general deference courts give to agencies.  
Peter Schuck and Donald Elliott’s study of published appellate decisions found a high level of judicial 
affirmances of agency decisions of all types.  Schuck & Elliott, supra note 66, at 1011 (noting that “in 
administrative law . . . the agency wins almost 90% of the time”). 
 95. Id. at 1010–11. 
 96. Shapiro, supra note 58. 
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from issuing new regulations.  Even though positive political theory 
would suggest that enacting coalitions control agencies by adopting pro-
cedures for rulemaking review,97 Shapiro found that the key determinant 
of regulatory activity in the states was the existing political climate.  
When the existing coalition was supportive of regulatory change, change 
tended to occur, notwithstanding the presence of procedural hurdles put 
in place by earlier coalitions.98 
Recent and emerging empirical research on both rulemaking trends 
and the frequency of judicial review raises questions about the extent to 
which judicial review has ossified the regulatory process.  As these em-
pirical findings run counter to the prevailing understanding among ad-
ministrative law scholars, it should be clear that empirical analysis has 
become highly relevant to central issues in administrative law.  Addi-
tional empirical research would help illuminate these issues and provide 
still further avenues for assessing claims that judicial review hampers 
agency rulemaking. 
IV. NEGOTIATION AS REGULATORY REFORM 
Although the effects of judicial review merit further empirical in-
quiry, many administrative law scholars and policy makers have advo-
cated agency efforts designed to stave off the filing of litigation in the 
first place.99  Specifically, they have encouraged agencies to employ for-
mal negotiation with affected interests over the terms of new regulations 
in an effort to avoid litigation and speed up the rulemaking process. 
Negotiated rulemaking is a procedure by which government regula-
tions are negotiated by representatives from government, the private sec-
tor, and nongovernmental organizations prior to the agency’s decision to 
issue a proposal for a new regulation.100  A negotiated rulemaking com-
mittee comprising the affected interests and agency staff meets in an ef-
fort to reach unanimous agreement on a proposed rule.101  If the commit-
 
 97. See supra note 16. 
 98. Shapiro, supra note 58. 
 99. See, e.g., Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 18 
(1982) (urging use of negotiated rulemaking as a cure for a “bitterly adversarial” regulatory process).  
Although the literature overall tends to stress the potential benefits of negotiated rulemaking, some 
scholars have recently expressed concerns about such a technique.  See, e.g., William Funk, Bargaining 
Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 
DUKE L.J. 1351, 1356 (1997) (arguing that “the principles, theory, and practice of negotiated rulemak-
ing subtly subvert the basic, underlying concepts of American administrative law”); Michael 
McCloskey, Problems with Using Collaboration to Shape Environmental Public Policy, 34 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 423 (2000) (suggesting that “[t]urning over the power of government to collaboratives is mis-
guided and a departure from democratic ideals”); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incen-
tives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory Negotiation, 43 DUKE L.J. 1206, 1212 (1994) (observing that the 
claims of benefits from negotiated rulemaking “are mostly speculative”). 
 100. 5 U.S.C. §§ 584–585 (2000). 
 101. By statute, “consensus” is defined as unanimous concurrence or any lesser concurrence if 
agreed to unanimously by the committee.  5 U.S.C. § 562(2) (2002). 
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tee reaches such an agreement, the agency then uses it as a basis for its 
rule, which it then promulgates according to normal notice-and-comment 
procedures.102 
Because negotiated rulemaking is intended to encourage affected 
parties to reach agreement, rather than stake out protracted adversarial 
positions, its proponents have argued that it will decrease the amount of 
time it takes to develop regulations103 and reduce subsequent judicial 
challenges.104  In 1982, the Administrative Conference of the United 
States (ACUS) first recommended that agencies use negotiated rulemak-
ing procedures.  According to the then-chairman of ACUS, the “whole 
purpose of negotiated rulemaking was to keep things out of the 
courts.”105  In addition, ACUS hoped that negotiated rulemaking could 
reduce the long delays that were thought to characterize the rulemaking 
process.106 
The Federal Aviation Administration initiated the first negotiated 
rulemaking in 1983, using the procedure to develop rules governing the 
frequency of flying time for airline personnel.107  Since that time, about 
fifteen federal agencies have used negotiated rulemaking to develop 
more than thirty regulations.108  In 1990, Congress formally authorized 
the practice by enacting the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990.109  Con-
gress has also adopted more than two dozen other statutes requiring or 
 
 102. The Administrative Procedure Act requires agencies to publish a notice of proposed rule-
making, provide an opportunity for interested persons to comment on the rule, and when issuing the 
final rule provide a statement of the basis and purpose of the final decision.  5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000). 
 103. See, e.g., ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., BUILDING CONSENSUS IN AGENCY 
RULEMAKING: IMPLEMENTING THE NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING ACT 1 (1995) (“reg-neg can improve 
the . . . timeliness of regulations”); Harter, supra note 99, at 30 (negotiated rulemaking “can reduce the 
time and cost of developing regulations”). 
 104. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS IN A 
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 202 (Paul C. Stern & Harvey V. Fineberg eds., 1996) (“The purpose of regula-
tory negotiation is to reduce legal challenges to new rules by involving would-be adversaries directly in 
the rule-making process and by producing a draft rule that meets legal requirements and is acceptable 
to a wide array of interested and affected parties.”); Harter, supra note 99, at 102 (advocating negoti-
ated rulemaking because it “may reduce judicial challenges to a rule because those parties most di-
rectly affected, who are also the most likely to bring suits, actually would participate in its develop-
ment”); Patricia M. Wald, Negotiation of Environmental Disputes: A New Role for the Courts?, 10 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 18 (1985) (noting that advocates of negotiated rulemaking claim this proce-
dure will “soften the adversary posture that animates the current comment process and reduce the 
inevitability of legal challenges to adopted rules”). 
 105. Colloquium, The Fifth Annual Robert C. Byrd Conference on the Administrative Process: The 
First Year of Clinton/Gore: Reinventing Government or Refining Reagan/Bush Initiatives?, 8 ADMIN. 
L.J. AM. U. 23, 62 (1994) (statement of Judge Loren Smith, chairman of ACUS at the time of its first 
recommendation on negotiated rulemaking). 
 106. Admin. Conference of the U.S., Recommendation 82-4, Procedures for Negotiating Pro-
posed Regulations, 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1983) (noting that traditional forms of rulemaking had re-
sulted in “[l]ong periods of delay” and had become “needlessly expensive”). 
 107. See Flight Time, Duty Time & Rest Requirements for Flight Crewmembers Utilized by Air 
Carriers, 48 Fed. Reg. 21,339 (proposed May 12, 1983). 
 108. Coglianese, supra note 24, at 1273–75. 
 109. 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570 (2000). 
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encouraging agencies to use negotiated rulemaking or similar consensus-
based procedures.110 
Although negotiated rulemaking has captured the attention of poli-
cymakers who view it as an attractive alternative to traditional rulemak-
ing, empirical inquiry is needed to establish how successful it is in prac-
tice.  Empirical analysis provides the appropriate basis for assessing the 
impact negotiation has had on the rulemaking process and how well it 
has achieved its goals of saving time and reducing litigation.111 
Over the years, administrative law scholars have published a series 
of case studies of individual negotiated rules, but these case studies pro-
vide an insufficient basis for determining the impact and value of negoti-
ated rulemaking.  First, many of these case studies have focused on what 
their authors perceive to be successful examples of negotiated rulemak-
ing, rather than providing a representative sample of negotiations, both 
of failures as well as successes.112  Second, these case studies have fre-
quently been written by the very practitioners who were involved in the 
negotiations, rather than by independent observers.113  Finally, case stud-
ies that focus purely on negotiated rules—with no comparison with simi-
lar cases of nonnegotiated rules—do not permit any inferences to be 
made about what would have happened in the absence of negotiation.114 
As with any evaluation of a regulatory innovation, it is necessary in 
evaluating negotiated rulemaking to compare rules that were negotiated 
against a counterfactual.  In the case of negotiated rulemaking, this coun-
terfactual is properly thought of as what would have likely happened in 
 
 110. Cary Coglianese, Is Consensus an Appropriate Basis for Regulatory Policy?, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO REGULATORY INNOVATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 93, 93 n.2 (Eric W. Orts & Kurt Deketelaere eds., 2001). 
 111. See, e.g., Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated 
Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133, 142 (1985) (noting that the benefits of negotiated rulemaking 
need to be demonstrated). 
 112. For a discussion of the importance of including failures as well as successes in program 
evaluations, see Cary Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response to 
Philip Harter, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 386, 395 (2001). 
 113. See Barry G. Rabe, The Politics of Environmental Dispute Resolution, 16 POL’Y STUD. J. 585, 
591 (1988) (indicating that most of what we know about consensus building comes from practitioners 
and advocates of alternative dispute resolution).  For a careful case study that is an exception to this 
trend, see Christine B. Harrington, Howard Bellman: Using “Bundles of Input” to Negotiate an Envi-
ronmental Dispute, in WHEN TALK WORKS 105 (Deborah M. Kolb et al. eds., 1994) (providing an ac-
count of a regulatory negotiation at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 
 114. There have only been a few efforts to make explicit comparisons between negotiated rule-
making and traditional rulemaking.  For example, I have compared the performance of negotiated and 
traditional rulemaking in terms of the time it takes to develop the rule and any resulting litigation.  See 
generally Coglianese, supra note 24; Coglianese, supra note 112.  Steven Balla and John Wright have 
compared rules developed through collaborative processes and those developed through conventional 
means.  Steven J. Balla & John R. Wright, Consensual Rulemaking and the Time It Takes to Develop 
Rules (1999) (unpublished paper presented at the Fifth National Public Management Research Con-
ference, Dec. 3–4, 1999) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review).  In addition, Laura Lang-
bein and Neil Kerwin have published findings comparing the views of participants in negotiated rule-
makings with the views of individuals who filed comments in traditional rulemakings.  See generally 
Laura Langbein & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Regulatory Negotiation Versus Conventional Rule Making: 
Claims, Counterclaims, and Empirical Evidence, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 599 (2000). 
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the absence of an agency’s decision to use a negotiated rulemaking pro-
cedure.  For example, does the process of negotiation allow agencies to 
promulgate rules in less time than would otherwise be required?  Does 
negotiation reduce the amount of litigation that otherwise would have 
occurred? 
An empirical study I conducted compared all of the negotiated 
rulemakings that the EPA had completed with the population of signifi-
cant rulemakings EPA had developed through conventional means.115  
The EPA was selected for examination because its conventional rule-
making process, including its time demands, had already been exten-
sively studied.116  Moreover, the EPA was the agency that had completed 
the most negotiated rulemakings at the time of my study.  The total 
number of negotiated rules promulgated across all agencies has actually 
been quite small, only about thirty-five rules—or less than one-tenth of 
one percent of all agency rules.117  EPA has completed twelve negotiated 
rules, or about one-third of the total rules that have been negotiated by 
more than a dozen different federal agencies.118 
It turns out that the average and median negotiated rule at the EPA 
takes about the same amount of time to develop as the average and me-
dian nonnegotiated rule.119  As Table 1 shows, whether negotiated or not, 
significant EPA rules take on average about three years to develop.120  
Subsequent research by political scientists Steven Balla and John Wright 
has tended to confirm that regulatory negotiation does not shorten the 
regulatory process.121  In addition, these findings are consistent with the 
well-accepted view that negotiated rulemakings are intensive and time 
consuming for all who participate in them.122  According to another 
study, participants in negotiated rulemakings are more than three times 
as likely as participants in conventional rulemakings to complain that the 
rulemaking process takes too long.123 
When it comes to reducing litigation, the empirical evidence again 
fails to indicate that negotiated rulemaking has achieved its goal.  The 
rate at which EPA rules generally are challenged in court is, as noted 
 
 115. See Coglianese, supra note 24. 
 116. See Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R. Furlong, Time and Rulemaking: An Empirical Test of 
Theory, 2 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 113 (1992) (examining the duration of EPA rulemakings). 
 117. Coglianese, supra note 24, at 1277 tbl.2. 
 118. Id. at 1274. 
 119. Id. at 1280–84. 
 120. For an elaboration of my methods and results, see Coglianese, supra note 112, at 406–14. 
 121. Balla & Wright, supra note 114 (finding that “rules to which regulatory negotiation was ap-
plied took longer to issue than those developed through conventional proceedings, despite the fact 
that agencies were more likely to conduct regulatory negotiations in situations that were amenable to 
relatively rapid resolution”). 
 122. See Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for 
Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411, 457 (2000) (noting that “all commentators agree 
that negotiated rulemaking is an intensive process” that demands “a concentrated devotion of re-
sources by the agency and private negotiation participants”). 
 123. Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 114, at 620. 
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earlier, about twenty-five percent.124  Surprisingly, EPA’s negotiated 
rules have fared still worse when it comes to prompting legal challenges.  
As shown in Table 1, six of EPA’s twelve negotiated rules have been sub-
ject to petitions for judicial review filed in federal court, or a litigation 
rate of fifty percent.125  Moreover, these challenges to the negotiated 
rules do not appear to be any different than the challenges to conven-
tional rules in terms of their contentiousness.  The average number of pe-
titioners in these challenges is about the same (actually slightly higher) 
for negotiated rules as for EPA rulemaking overall.126  The percentage of 
legal challenges that result in a decision by judges is about the same for 
both groups, as is the percentage of challenges that are at least partially 
vindicated by the judges.127 
TABLE 1 
























3.0 35% 3.0 29% 51% 
The underlying sample of negotiated rules is admittedly small be-
cause the EPA, like other agencies, has simply not utilized the procedure 
very frequently. It is natural to wonder about the possibility of selection 
bias.  For example, have agencies simply selected the more challenging 
or contentious rules for negotiation?  While selection bias is always a po-
tential concern, in this case the selection bias appears to be in the oppo-
site direction.128  Agencies have by no means selected trivial rules for ne-
gotiation, but generally speaking the rules they have selected have been 
the ones that have been easier to negotiate, not harder.129  In fact, the 
Negotiated Rulemaking Act and agency guidelines instruct government 
officials to select rules for negotiation only if they have a prior likelihood 
 
 124. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 125. See Coglianese, supra note 24, at 1290–93, 1301–07. 
 126. See id. at 1310 n.252. 
 127. Id.; see also Coglianese, supra note 112, at 426–27 & tbl.2 (noting that “[t]he typical challenge 
filed against an EPA negotiated rule does not differ in any discernible way from the typical challenge 
filed against a conventional rule”). 
 128. See Coglianese, supra note 24, at 1320–21 (concluding that the rules selected for negotiation 
have tended to be ones that are more likely at the outset to be resolved without excessive delay or litiga-
tion). 
 129. See, e.g., Balla & Wright, supra note 114 (noting that agencies are more likely to use negotiation 
for those rules that are more amenable to quicker resolution); Jeffrey P. Cohn, Clearing the Air, GOV’T 
EXECUTIVE, Sept. 1, 1997, at 45, 50 (noting that “most negotiated rule-making involves relatively narrow 
issues”). 
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of successful and prompt resolution.130  The EPA has avoided using nego-
tiated rulemaking for its most contentious and significant rulemakings.131  
Instead, it has tended to utilize the procedure for what one EPA report 
characterized as “second-tier” rules.132  In short, the deck has been 
stacked in favor of finding that negotiated rules take less time and result 
in less litigation, making the resulting findings even stronger. 
In the face of the empirical evidence showing that negotiated rule-
making at EPA has not achieved its major goals of saving the agency 
time and reducing legal contestation, some have argued that negotiation 
might achieve still other goals, such as improving the quality of rules.133  
However, no empirical analysis has yet demonstrated that negotiated 
rules achieve these other goals,134 and other recent work actually suggests 
that negotiation can create new problems for policymaking, such as the 
lowest common denominator problem.135  While there is room for further 
empirical analysis of the effects of negotiated rulemaking, the empirical 
research that has been conducted to date provides a basis for making 
more informed decisions about how to structure the rulemaking process.  
The empirical record indicates that further efforts to promote consensus 
building will not likely reduce litigation or save time and suggests that 
such efforts are also unwarranted on other grounds.  Rather than simply 
accepting the enthusiastic promises that mediators and other advocates 
have made for negotiated rulemaking, policymakers can now rely on 
empirical findings to make better judgments in designing the rulemaking 
process. 
 
 130. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 563(a)(4) (2000) (directing agencies to select rules for negotiation for which 
there is a “likelihood that a committee will reach a consensus on the proposed rule within a fixed period 
of time”).  For an extended discussion of statutory and other guidelines for selecting rules for negotiation, 
see Coglianese, supra note 24, at 1319–20. 
 131. Coglianese, supra note 24, at 1318. 
 132. Program Evaluation Div., U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, An Assessment of EPA’s Negotiated 
Rulemaking Activities, in NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK 34, 34 (1990). 
 133. See Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual Performance of Negotiated Rule-
making, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 32, 54 (2000). 
 134. The Laura Langbein and Neil Kerwin study, supra note 114, has been said to suggest that 
negotiated rulemaking results in better quality rules.  Harter, supra note 133, at 56 (arguing that the 
Langbein and Kerwin study provides “powerful” support for the claim that negotiation improves 
rulemaking quality); see also CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 182 (2d ed. 1999) (arguing that his study with Langbein represents 
“the most compelling evidence to date . . . that negotiated rulemaking . . . produces results superior to 
conventional rulemaking”).  However, the Langbein and Kerwin study actually never investigated the 
outcomes of negotiated rulemaking, but instead compared the perceptions of participants in negoti-
ated rulemaking with those of individuals who filed comments in conventional rulemakings.  See 
Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 114, at 601.  Consequently, it does not provide a sound basis for draw-
ing inferences about the relative quality of negotiated rules.  For an extended discussion of the limita-
tions of the Langbein and Kerwin study, see Coglianese, supra note 112, at 430–38. 
 135. See Charles C. Caldart & Nicholas Ashford, Negotiation as a Means of Developing and Im-
plementing Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety Policy, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 141, 
201 (1999) (concluding that negotiated rulemaking can undermine the potential of regulation to en-
courage technological innovation); Coglianese, supra note 110 (discussing the pathologies of consen-
sus); McCloskey, supra note 99, at 434 (arguing that consensus building is a “cumbersome process that 
is plagued by disadvantages that outweighs its perceived advantages”). 
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CONCLUSION 
Each of the arenas for procedural reform that I have considered 
here have benefited from careful empirical research.  Given the level of 
interest in reforming the regulatory process, still further empirical re-
search will make a contribution to ongoing policy debates at the same 
time that it furthers scholarly understanding of law as a social instrument.  
I have raised each of the examples here to illustrate issues common to 
empirical analysis of law in a variety of areas of regulatory reform, not to 
suggest that these examples are exhaustive.  Important empirical work 
remains to be done in other areas of administrative law, such as on the 
impacts of procedures on the outcomes of administrative law judges or 
the impact that varying standards of review may have on judicial decision 
making. 
In order to understand how law can influence governing institutions 
within society, it is vital to examine how procedures actually affect the 
behavior of administrative agencies and to learn more about the condi-
tions under which different procedural arrangements might yield better 
policy outcomes.  Empirical analysis should therefore go hand in hand 
with the implementation of any regulatory reform.  By choosing appro-
priate research strategies and attending with care to issues of empirical 
validity, researchers will be able to explain better how administrative law 
affects the behavior and outcomes of government agencies.  Empirical 
research on administrative law has the potential for evaluating and ulti-
mately improving prescriptive efforts to design administrative proce-
dures in ways that contribute to more effective and legitimate govern-
ance. 
COGLIANESE.DOC 2/20/2003  2:57 PM 
1138 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2002 
 
